

**GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**AUDIT OF CONTRACT PERFORMANCE  
MEASURES AND THE MAYOR'S SCORECARD  
MEASURES**



**CHARLES C. MADDOX, ESQ.  
Inspector General**

**GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**  
**Office of the Inspector General**

Inspector General



March 20, 2001

The Honorable Anthony A. Williams  
Mayor of the District of Columbia  
One Judiciary Square  
441 4<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W., Suite 1100  
Washington, D.C. 20001

Mr. John A. Koskinen  
Deputy Mayor and City Administrator  
Office of the City Administrator  
441 4<sup>th</sup> Street, N.W., Suite 1120  
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Mayor Williams and Mr. Koskinen:

The Office of the City Administrator (OCA) requested the Office of the Inspector General to verify agency performance results so that it could determine the extent to which stakeholders could rely upon reported results. The Mayor has also indicated his commitment to “trust but verify” reported results. Enclosed is our report summarizing the results of our Audit of Contract Performance Measures and the Mayor’s Scorecard Measures (OIG-00-2-12MA).

The review included tests to verify the performance results at the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS), Department of Public Works (DPW), and Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Other District agencies, which we did not audit, may be able to improve their processes and controls by taking note of the types of conditions we observed and the corrective actions taken and planned by the agencies that we audited.

Specifically, our audit identified areas where improvement was needed:

- We recommended that MPD change how it calculates and reports Scorecard Measure results for homicide clearance rates. MPD agreed to fully disclose in performance reports how it calculates homicide clearance rates (Finding 1).
- We also recommended that MPD develop internal controls that ensure an adequate audit trail, figures are supported, and documents are retained in support of the performance measures. MPD agreed to provide controls (Finding 2).

- We recommended that the DCFEMS develop methodology, procedures, and controls for documenting, reviewing, and reporting accurate performance measures. DCFEMS agreed with the recommendation and plans to fully implement the recommendation by April 30, 2001 (Finding 3).
- We recommended that DPW and the District Division of Transportation (DDOT) establish management controls that would assure accurate and verifiable data in support of performance measures. DPW deferred to DDOT on all recommendations. DDOT established a management control system to appropriately verify data in support of performance measures (Finding 4).
- We also recommended that the DPW and DDOT disclose in future reporting of resurfaced street areas the methodology employed in measuring, omit or reclassify spot resurfacing from its external performance reporting, and improve its controls by documenting and publishing definitions of the various resurfacing categories. DDOT agreed to formalize reporting procedures by providing clear guidelines and establish them as Standard Operating Procedures by January 20, 2001. Spot resurfacing often includes full block milling and overlay, and DPW will continue to include spot resurfacing in those instances (Finding 6).
- We recommended that DMV: disclose in performance reports the extent to which the results capture or omit locations and customers; include all locations when calculating contract performance measures and scorecard measures to the extent it is cost effective; and develop written procedures and controls to describe proper methodology to measure, calculate, and report performance results. DMV is reassessing current performance measurement procedures and controls and expects to develop written guidelines by the end of April 2001 (Finding 7).
- We also recommended DMV discontinue computing average service time using customer surveys and determine the average inspection service time of a vehicle by obtaining the data from the Information Control Vehicle Inspection System. DMV will discontinue computing average service time using customer service surveys at the end of February, and begin to determine the inspection service time through data derived from a more appropriate method by the end of March 2001 (Finding 8).
- We recommended that OCA establish accountability for agency implementation of performance measures at all times, including those periods in which an acting or interim director is in charge of an agency. In response, OCA established a process that would increase accountability of interim agency heads. In addition, OCA plans to complete overall guidelines for the District's performance management system by the end of summer 2001 concurrent with draft performance contracts for agency directors (Finding 5).

Management responses from the Office of the City Administrator and audited agencies adequately addressed the conditions we observed and the recommendations we made to them

in Management Alert Reports during the course of the audit. In consolidating the information into this report from the various Management Alert Reports, we renumbered the findings and recommendations. Exhibit 2 (page 25) provides a means to relate the findings and recommendations of this report to corresponding management responses to the Management Alert Reports. A summary of managements' responses to those reports are provided after each recommendation in this report and included verbatim in Exhibit 2.

Managements' planned or completed actions should improve the processes and controls, which in turn, should yield improved performance reporting. Agency management should keep us informed when planned action dates are met or need to be extended so that we may enter the information into our recommendation tracking system. The consolidated responses for the Mayor, Chief of Staff, Deputy Mayor/City Administrator, and the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice are provided in Exhibit 3.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies of agency personnel and the facilities made available to us during the audit. Should you have questions about this, please call me or William J. DiVello, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at 727-2540.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Charles C. Maddox". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Charles" being the most prominent part.

Charles C. Maddox, Esq.  
Inspector General

Enclosure

CM/jbe

cc: Dr. Abdusalam Omer, Chief of Staff, Office of the Mayor's Chief of Staff  
Ms. Margaret Nedelkoff Kellems, Deputy Mayor, Public Safety and Justice  
Chief, Metropolitan Police Department (3 copies)  
Chief, Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (3 copies)  
Director, Department of Public Works (3 copies)  
Director, Department of Motor Vehicles (3 copies)  
Director, District Division of Transportation (3 copies)

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Deputy Mayors (1 copy each)  
Agency Heads (1 copy each)  
Mr. Doug Douglas D. Smith, Program Analyst, Performance Management, Office of the  
Deputy Mayor/City Administrator (15 copies)

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# INTRODUCTION

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## BACKGROUND

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed a review of selected measures of fiscal year (FY) 2000 Performance Contracts and Calendar Year (CY) 2000 Scorecard Measures for four District Government agencies—Department of Public Works (DPW), Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), the Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DCFEMS), and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). The performance contracts and scorecards are at the heart of the Mayor's performance management system that introduces accountability for each agency and employee in order to transform the District Government into one that is responsive to its citizens. The Deputy Mayor/City Administrator requested the OIG to spot-check individual measures reported and audit agencies' data collection practices.

As a result of hearings regarding the District of Columbia Government's performance in serving its residents, Congress enacted a law in 1994 intended to provide a disciplined approach to improving the District's performance. It required the Mayor to develop and submit a performance accountability plan for all departments, agencies, and programs of the government for the subsequent fiscal year. The law, amended in 1997, required the Mayor to issue a performance accountability plan with goals for the next year no later than March 1<sup>st</sup> of each year. The Act also instructed the Mayor to provide a performance accountability report on the prior year's achievements compared with the prior year's planned performance. These requirements are codified in the District of Columbia Code. D.C. Code §§ 47-231 - 232 require the Mayor to submit performance measures and accomplishments to Congress, while §§ 1-615.11 - .14 require each agency to report performance to the Council of the District of Columbia.

We found that Pub. L. No. 106-449, signed November 6, 2000, revised the planning and reporting requirements to require submission of the District's performance accountability plan concurrent with the submission of the District's budget to the Congress. This requirement would be effective for the FY 2002 budget due to Congress on June 1, 2001.

The Office of the City Administrator (OCA) is responsible for administering the performance measures program on behalf of the Mayor. Agencies are expected to measure performance described in performance contracts and performance referred to as scorecard measures. Performance contract requirements establish expectations of the Mayor of the District of Columbia for senior management. Performance contracts, unique to each agency head, describe expectations for the fiscal year. The Mayor and the agency head sign the applicable contract. Both planned and actual performance are to be reported to the Congress and the City Council as set forth in the D.C. Code. This audit report refers to those measures as contract performance measures (CPM). Additionally, scorecard measures (SCM) are commitments or goals, set by the Mayor on behalf of the citizens of the District of Columbia, which are intended to be achieved by certain deadlines. The scorecards give residents a unique opportunity to hold the Mayor and his cabinet accountable for achieving citizen goals from the City-Wide Strategic Plan. This plan is the Mayor's action plan to achieve citizen priorities in five areas: Building and Sustaining Healthy Neighborhoods; Strengthening

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Children, Youth, Families, and Individuals; Promoting Economic Development; Making Government Work; and Enhancing Unity of Purpose and Democracy. Some scorecard items are interrelated with the measures included in the performance contracts.

## OBJECTIVES

The overall objectives of this review at selected agencies were to:

1. Verify the data supporting the reported achievements regarding the FY 2000 Performance Contracts and the Mayor's Scorecards for effort in calendar year 2000.
2. Determine the extent of implementation of internal controls to prevent or detect material errors and irregularities in reporting performance measurements.

## SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We reviewed 12 CPMs and 13 SCMs assigned in year 2000 to 4 District agencies: Department of Public Works, the Department of Motor Vehicles, the Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, and the Metropolitan Police Department. We conducted our fieldwork during the period September 2000 through January 2001 at the agencies' headquarters and field offices. Exhibit 1 identifies the performance and scorecard measures for the agencies we reviewed and also identifies those measures we tested. We did not review all the measures because of time limitations. Although we consulted with OCA on the selection of scorecard requirements to test, the OIG made the final selection. We performed the audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests, as we considered necessary under the circumstances.

We reviewed CPM and SCM documentation and reports, examined controls, General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, legislation, and interviewed personnel. Primarily, our emphasis was on how the agencies calculated and supported the figures and results they reported or would report to OCA.

In our examination of homicide clearance rates, we tested two of the seven police districts' figures for the calendar year, as of October 31, 2000. We did not evaluate whether MPD used appropriate criteria in classifying homicide cases as cleared.

The previous two fire chiefs acted on an interim basis and CPMs were not established. The current Fire Chief assumed the position in July 2000 and did not have a contract establishing CPMs for fiscal year 2000. Our review focused on the four scorecard measures set for calendar year 2000.

We issued four Management Alert Reports (MAR), one to each agency we reviewed. This report consolidates those findings into this report but rennumbers the findings and



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recommendations to avoid confusion. Exhibit 2 (page 25) shows the correlation between the findings and recommendations in this report and the MARs.

## PRIOR AUDITS

GAO continues to monitor the reporting of the District's performance measures and made recommendations in its report issued April 14, 2000, "District of Columbia Government Performance Report's Adherence to Statutory Requirements," GAO/GGD-00-107. The former City Administrator/Deputy Mayor for Operations responded to the recommendations. However, the GAO had reservations that some of the planned actions regarding the requirement to compare in reports to Congress the actual level of performance achieved to the stated goal for an acceptable level of performance and for a superior level of performance would not "satisfy the current requirements in the law." Our discussions with a representative of OCA indicated that the District would likely resolve GAO's reservations by seeking changes to the public laws involved. We found that Pub. L. No. 106-449, signed November 6, 2000, revised the planning and reporting requirements. In the meantime, we found no evidence that D.C. Code §§ 1-615.12 - .14 had been revised to eliminate the requirement to plan and report to the City Council more than one level of performance. A representative of the City Administrator advised that the City Council would be notified.

## REVISIONS TO THE DRAFT REPORT

This final report contains minor editorial revisions to the draft report that the OIG circulated for comment on March 15, 2001. In addition, certain factual clarifications are included in the final report. In the background section on pages i and ii, the report includes a new paragraph to show that Pub. L. No. 106-449 provides for submitting the performance accountability plan concurrent with the submission of the budget. Also on page i, the report now includes corrected titles for the Citywide Strategic Plan priority areas. On page v, this report reflects a new date for establishment of two additional paramedic engine companies, which is based on new information from OCA. On page 2, a revised footnote to clarify that MPD provided data on homicides that was readily available in its computerized records; such data was limited to open homicides in the years from 1987 to 2000. While we did not revise the finding on page 16 regarding the H Street location, this report recognizes that DMV's plans were to move from that location. Accordingly, it would not have been cost effective to install a crowd control system in that location. The OCA advised the OIG that the DMV conducted spot checks to ensure that users of the H Street location were moving through the facility in a timely fashion. On page 7 the report reflects that authorizing language for cross-trained paramedic/firefighters has been inserted into the FY 2002 Budget Act. Page 11 was revised to show that that FY 2001 performance contracts would not be finalized until mid-April.

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## OTHER MATTERS

In our opinion, performance measurement data does not necessarily need to be as accurate as the data necessary for making payment or for data associated with safety. However, it should be reasonably accurate for its intended management use, and the costs of gathering information that is more accurate should be weighed with the benefits. Agencies should improve reporting as experience is gained, especially when independent feedback (such as this Audit Report) is made available to them.

In addition to the findings and recommendations discussed later in this report, we made observations about other CPMs and SCMs and other matters pertaining to agencies and management.

**Office of the City Administrator.** OCA did not initially provide agencies with sufficient standardized guidance in calculating, documenting, and reporting accomplishments resulting from performance contracts and scorecard measures. Such guidance should have prescribed steps, processes, and standards for calculating results, maintaining records and other supporting documentation for independent verification, and reporting accomplishments. As a result, in at least two of the four agencies reviewed, the agencies did not maintain supporting documentation for the accomplishments they reported. OCA also independently recognized the need for standard procedures and expects to issue the performance review process guidelines by the end of the summer 2001. The guidelines will explain the interrelationships between the components comprising the management system and will also clarify how the District's performance management system complies with the requirements of the Government Managers Accountability Act of 1995 and related requirements in the Federal Payment Reauthorization Act of 1994. Since OCA is taking action to improve guidance (see Exhibit 2, page 35), no recommendations were considered necessary. Notwithstanding OCA's actions, District agencies will necessarily need to supplement OCA's guidance for performance activities and controls unique to their agencies.

**Metropolitan Police Department.** MPD met the goal for its SCM No. 1, which required adding 200 additional officers to patrol the city's streets. MPD scheduled 661 officers for redeployment to street patrol from other functions for one week out of each month. Such functions, for example, included administration, training, internal affairs, and special operations. These redeployed officers were divided into four groups. Group A would patrol during the first week, while Groups B, C, and D had the second, third, and fourth weeks, respectively. We concluded that MPD met its goal based on our limited tests of Supervisory Activity Summary reports and roll call documents for selected weeks in the months of September through December 2000 for two police district offices.

The Chief signed a performance contract with those senior managers whose authority and responsibilities were aligned to the goals of the Chief's performance contract with the Mayor. Accordingly, MPD met its goal for CPM No. 2, which required the Chief to establish performance contracts with senior level managers.

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**Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services.** We believe that DCFEMS reported accurately based on output from its unaudited Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System for SCM No. 1. Resources were not available to test the system in the time available. DCFEMS reported accurately for SCM Nos. 2 and 3.

- For SCM No. 1, DCFEMS reported to OCA that 54 percent of critical calls had a response time to the scene within 8 minutes from the time of the emergency call. In measuring critical calls, DCFEMS collected data for Advanced Life Support calls. Although DCFEMS did not meet its goal of 90 percent, DCFEMS had reduced its average response time by 80 seconds between October and the end of November 2000 (from an average of 16 minutes 9 seconds for October 2000 to 14 minutes 49 seconds in November 2000).
- For SCM No. 2, DCFEMS reported that six engine companies were re-designated as paramedic-engine companies; its goal was to establish eight paramedic-engine companies. Two other paramedic engine companies were initially scheduled for establishment in December 2000 but were rescheduled for establishment no later than September 2001 because too few paramedics were available. DCFEMS established each of the six paramedic-engine companies by adding a paramedic to an engine company. Since the paramedic is not a firefighter, the paramedic becomes a fifth person when attached to a normal contingent for an engine company of four firefighters.
- For SCM No. 3, DCFEMS exceeded its goal of filling 120 firefighter vacancies. DCFEMS had a net gain of 136 firefighters through December 2000.

**Department of Public Works/District Division of Transportation.** Our tests verified that DPW generally met the requirements for another three CPMs and two SCMs that we tested. However, we were unable to test CPM No. 1, Alignment to the Mayor's Strategic Plan, because the performance contract insufficiently defined this CPM in terms of quantifiable expectations. Accordingly, we had no basis to compare actual performance to expected performance.

**Responsiveness to Customers (CPM Nos. 4 and 11).** These measures were essentially the same with CPM No. 4, a general measure applicable to many agencies, and CPM No. 11, a measure unique to DPW/DDOT. Our tests of a judgmental sample of 24 requests showed that DPW responded to 22 requests for services within 48 hours (91.7 percent) and the remaining 2 requests within 72 hours (i.e., 24 of 24 requests within 72 hours - 100 percent), as DPW chose to calculate the measure. These CPMs required responding to requests 80 percent of the time within 48 hours and 100 percent of the time within 72 hours.

The performance contract did not clearly define the measures "48 hours and 72 hours." DPW recorded receipt and response dates, not clock hours for the dates. We believe that the workdays that DPW used are an acceptable measure but should be clearly

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defined in the performance contract. The performance contract should clearly define the measure in terms of work hours, 24-hour days, or work days (i.e., 2 work days equals 48 hours). Without such definition, we reasoned that 2 work days was a reasonable definition of the requirement. Should the requirement be defined in terms of work hours or 24-hour days, then DPW will need to clock in customer requests and responses. To clarify further, DPW counted as a workday any receipts of that day, regardless of the time received. Accordingly, DPW was conservative in actually allowing fewer hours to meet its goal than would be available by a strict 24-hour day, except when weekends and holidays would be involved. Regardless of the definition used, our tests showed that in 18 of 24 instances (75 percent), DPW responded the same calendar day as the request/complaint.

**Tree Planting (CPM No. 13 and SCM No. 1).** For these measures of new tree planting, we found that DPW was generally reporting accurately from its database. DPW had until December 31, 2000, to plant 6000 trees. As of April 30, 2000, DPW's data base showed 4,194 trees (which may be rounded to 4,200) were planted. Through a clerical error, DPW reported 4,500 trees, a math error of 300 trees. DPW does not generally plant trees in warm-weather months. We made limited tests including physical observations at 21 locations for 49 trees that the database listed as having recently-planted trees and found that the database was generally correct. We found that 47 trees were in the area designated by the database. One tree was not in the designated area because a gas meter was in the tree box, but we found a tree planted in another area that was not listed in the data base. Additionally, we found that a tree was missing from another designated location; the tree box contained recently planted flowers. Overall, we accounted for 45 of the 49 trees in their designated areas, observed 2 additional trees that were not in the data base, and could not account for 4 trees. The contractor who planted these trees is responsible for replacing trees that do not survive in the first year.

**Replacement of Lions on the Taft Bridge (SCM No. 3).** DPW was required by this measure to replace the lions on the Taft Bridge by July 2000. On October 11, 2000, we observed that the lions had been installed.

# FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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## **FINDING 1: CALCULATION OF MPD'S SCM NO. 4 FOR HOMICIDE CLEARANCE RATE**

### **SYNOPSIS**

MPD calculated its homicide clearance rate in accordance with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program and used these same calculations to report its progress in meeting the goals for its SCM No. 4. However, the UCR Program calculates the rate by dividing the **current-year-only** homicide occurrences into the total number of homicide cases cleared, which includes cases that were opened in the **current and prior** years. By omitting prior-year cases available to be closed during the year but including cleared cases relating to prior years, the resulting quotient may mislead users of annual performance measure results. MPD and OCA representatives and the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice advised that UCR Program figures were used for comparability with other jurisdictions. A 36 percent clearance rate for cases opened and cleared in the year and a 6 percent overall clearance rate for cases available to be cleared in that calendar year present a more accurate assessment of annual performance than the reported 57 percent homicide clearance rate.

UCR reports are based on long entrenched formulas prescribed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for crime indicators that serve in identifying nationwide trends in crime. These indicators attempt to depict the severity of the crime problem in America. By also using these statistics as a performance measure, without full disclosure, the potential for stakeholders to assume MPD is accomplishing a higher mathematical clearance rate than actually occurred is increased.

### **DISCUSSION**

SCM No. 4 provided that MPD's goal was to achieve a 65 percent Homicide Clearance Rate in calendar year 2000. MPD reported that it cleared 57 percent of the homicide cases. While we question the value of using UCR Program data to measure its clearance rate, the goal of 65 percent was established with the intent to use such data. Accordingly, it would be injudicious to compare that goal to the results obtained by using other methods of calculating annual clearance rates, such as the 6 percent and 36 percent clearance rates we calculated.

MPD calculated its clearance rate of 57 percent by dividing the total homicides occurring in calendar year 2000 into the total cases cleared during the year, regardless of whether the cases applied to CY 2000 or prior years. We recalculated the rate by including

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

the 2,118 prior year unsolved homicides as of January 1, 2000, with the 237<sup>1</sup> cases opened (occurring) in the year. The recalculation reported the homicide clearance rate to be 6 percent, not the 57 percent reported. We also recalculated the rate using only the homicides occurring during calendar year 2000 and those CY 2000 homicides that were cleared. This rate was 36 percent. These rates and calculations, shown in the Table, present actual performance compared with associated available workload, unlike UCR Program calculations.

**Table: Homicide Clearance Rates for Calendar Year 2000**

Categories	Method of Computation		
	UCR Program	Current Year Only	Current and Prior Year
<b>Open Homicide Cases</b>			
Open Homicides as of 1/1/2000	N/A	N/A	2,118 <sup>2</sup>
Homicides Opened in CY 2000	<u>237</u>	<u>237</u>	<u>237</u>
<b>Total Open Homicides</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>2,355</b>
<b>Homicides Cleared</b>			
Prior Year Homicides Cleared	48	N/A	48
CY 2000 Homicides Cleared	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>
<b>Total Homicides Cleared</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>134</b>
Balance of Open Homicides	<b>103</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>2,221</b>
Homicide Clearance Rate	<b>57%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>6%</b>
Computation Formula	134/237	86/237	134/2,355

The UCR Program collects and correlates crime information from law enforcement agencies throughout the country. The Federal Bureau of Investigation developed the UCR Program to identify nationwide trends in crime by incorporating statistics submitted by various law enforcement agencies throughout the country. Additionally, Federal Bureau of Investigation officials, responsible for the UCR Program, stated that the program was not intended as a performance measurement tool.

<sup>1</sup> Our calculations are based on reports and support made available to us in January 2001. The reports provided cumulative totals through December 31, 2000. A test of data from two of the police districts showed reasonable accuracy in reporting homicide occurrences for the cumulative report through October 31, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> We asked MPD for all of its open (unsolved) homicide cases. MPD provided information from its automated system, which did not include cases opened or closed prior to 1987.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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The Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice and representatives of OCA and MPD agreed that MPD should report UCR Program statistics for its SCM, instead of using other calculation methods, so that the city's performance could be compared fairly with other cities. However, MPD is not alone in reporting only UCR Program statistics to the public. A representative of the Baltimore City Police Department advised that it also reported its homicide clearance rate to the public using the UCR Program methodology.

The current year only computation method shown in the Table provides very good management information, which would be useful to the District in comparing performance measurements from year to year. However, it does not capture all of MPD's performance as does the "current- and prior-year" method. Both methods have value. Should MPD establish reachable goals for improvement in these categories, we would expect improved performance.

Notwithstanding the need to use better computation methods, the city must also consider the very real possibility that resulting statistics would be compared to the UCR Program statistics of other jurisdictions without reference to their significant notable distinctions. Accordingly, MPD reports should fully disclose in its reports how its results were derived and their relationship to UCR Program statistics.

### **RECOMMENDATION 1**

We recommend that the Chief, MPD, report homicide clearance rates that are computed using the "current-year" and the "current- and prior-year" methods and establish goals based on these methodologies.

### **MPD RESPONSE**

The Chief agreed that the UCR homicide clearance rate, from a purely statistical view, may not satisfy the requirements of a yearly performance measure. However, he believed that the recommended action also fell short in measuring performance. The "current year" option is inadequate because it does not report on previous year open cases that were closed in the current year. The "current-and prior-year" measure also cannot adequately reflect performance because it includes prior year open homicides, which may not have been worked on during the year.

The Chief proposed an alternative recommendation that MPD continue to use the UCR homicide clearance rate and clearly explain how the rate is calculated. The explanation will be placed on all documents that report the performance measure. The action is completed and the explanations will be reflected in the FY 2002 budget book. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **OIG COMMENT**

Our main concern with MPD's use of the UCR homicide clearance rate was the potential to mislead stakeholders of what the rate represented and how it was calculated. We believe that MPD's proposed alternative action meets the intent of our recommendation. MPD stated it has completed action. The action would necessarily require documenting in MPD's management controls over methods and processes the means by which MPD ensures that the explanation will be disclosed with the performance statistics. Therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved and closed.



## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **FINDING 2: REDUCING VIOLENT CRIMES AND PROPERTY CRIMES BY 5 PERCENT FROM THE PRIOR YEAR**

#### **SYNOPSIS**

MPD reported its progress in reaching its goals for CPM No. 11, and SCM Nos. 2 and 3, which were to reduce violent crimes and property crimes by 5percent over the prior year. However, MPD was unable to provide documentation to support its figures. MPD lacked supporting documentation because it did not develop internal management controls that would ensure that the figures could be independently verified. Consequently, we were unable to verify figures reported.

#### **DISCUSSION**

MPD reported a 1percent increase in violent crimes for the period January 1 through October 31, 2000, and a 5 percent decrease in property crimes for the same period in the prior year. However, neither Headquarters nor the two police districts we visited maintained itemized reports identifying the specific cases that supported the figures reported by Headquarters. In an attempt to identify these cases, we requested both police districts provide a special computer run listing all cases that occurred between January 1 and October 31, 2000. One district office provided a listing; however, the listing and summaries did not agree with either the Headquarters report or a prior district report for that same period because of timing differences. The other district informed us that they could not produce a run for that period. Without an adequate audit trail, we could not verify MPD's figures.

It is essential that MPD maintain documentation or an adequate audit trail that supports the accuracy of the data reported to the Mayor, Congress, and the District of Columbia's Council.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 2**

We recommend that the Chief, MPD, develop internal controls that ensure an adequate audit trail, figures are supported, and documents retained in support of the various performance measures.

#### **MPD RESPONSE**

The Chief responded that MPD's primary crime data file undergoes changes but that the data available on one date will be different on another date. He attributed the differences to the lag of paperwork and the system updating crime information by the occurrence date and not the date of data entry. He stated that the problem is not so much that the system is dynamic but that MPD did not print out a computer listing of raw data that supports the

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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reported end-of-month statistics. However, beginning in February 2001, MPD will generate a printout for each month's report, sorted by offense, which will itemize the Central Complaint Number, victim's name, district, and date of offense. The listing will be filed with each month's preliminary crime report and will support the year-to-date statistics. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

### **OIG COMMENT**

MPD's action should provide the necessary support and audit trail for future verifications. Satisfactory action would require that MPD document its new controls in its management control system so that existing or future personnel understand clearly the processes and methods. We consider the recommendation resolved and closed.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### FINDING 3: CROSS-TRAINED/DUAL ROLE FIREFIGHTER PARAMEDICS

#### SYNOPSIS

DCFEMS incorrectly reported initially that it had exceeded its goal for SCM No. 4 and had cross-trained 32 civilian paramedics as firefighters, which were then redeployed as firefighter/paramedics to Paramedic Engine Companies. However, no paramedics were cross-trained or redeployed. DCFEMS personnel stated that it erred in its reporting as a result of a miscommunication and misunderstanding between the Deputy Chief, DCFEMS, and the Chief, Emergency Medical Services Bureau. We attribute the misreporting and miscommunication to a lack of written management controls and procedures for developing, documenting, reviewing, and reporting performance measures. As a result of our review, DCFEMS timely corrected its reports to OCA. However, without adequately documented management procedures and controls, the potential for misreporting still exists.

#### DISCUSSION

Scorecard measure No. 4 required DCFEMS to train and redeploy 20 civilian paramedics as dual role/cross trained firefighter paramedics. However, DCFEMS incorrectly reported that it exceeded its goal and cross-trained 32 civilian paramedics as dual role/cross trained firefighter/paramedics and redeployed them to paramedic engine companies. During our examination and testing of records for cross training, DCFEMS officials informed us that they erred in their reporting and stated that the 32 civilian paramedics were not cross-trained as dual role firefighter/paramedics and only received the basic 40-hour engine company orientation class during fiscal years 1999 and 2000. Additionally, DCFEMS personnel stated that civilian paramedics were not redeployed as reported but were detailed to a paramedic engine company as a fifth man on a four-person engine unit, which created the paramedic engine companies. Such fifth man assignments are more costly than assigning, as one of the four firefighters, a paramedic cross-trained as a firefighter. OCA and DCFEMS representatives advised that legislation needs to be passed before this goal can be implemented. Subsequently, OCA advised that authorizing language has been inserted into the FY 2002 Budget Support Act.

DCFEMS officials noted that the error in reporting was due to a misunderstanding and miscommunication of facts between the two divisions, Fire and EMS. When we brought the discrepancy to management's attention, DCFEMS immediately provided corrected SCM information in its report, dated December 19, 2000, to OCA. DCFEMS officials also agreed that DCFEMS lacks written procedures or controls regarding scorecard or performance measures. They noted that the various division reports are consolidated for the monthly DCFEMS reports without adequate review. Without sufficient controls and procedures in place to ensure the accuracy of the information reported, the potential for misreporting still exists.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

We recommend that the Chief, DCFEMS, develop methodology, procedures, and controls for documenting, reviewing, and reporting accurate performance measures.

### **DCFEMS RESPONSE**

The Chief agreed with the recommendation. He plans to develop methodology, procedures, and controls for documenting, reviewing, and reporting accurate performance measures by the end of March, and to fully implement the recommendation by the middle of April. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

### **OIG COMMENT**

The action proposed by DCFEMS should alleviate the condition we observed. DCFEMS should notify the OIG when it completes its planned action. The recommendation is resolved.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### **FINDING 4: SUPPORTING DATA FOR CPM NO. 9 - CURBSIDE MANAGEMENT AND CPM NO. 8 - TRANSPORTATION**

DPW reported to OCA that it met or nearly met its CPM targets of responsiveness to reports of damaged stop or yield signs, street light outages, and potholes. However, DPW/DDOT was unable to provide any support for the monthly statistics it had reported. DPW lacks systems and management controls that would ensure accurate reporting regardless of staff turnover. Consequently, OCA should not rely upon prior DPW reports for these measures.

For example, in July and August 2000, DPW reported that it filled 100 percent of the potholes reported within 72 hours, which met the CPM No. 8 target. However, DPW had no information to support its reports to OCA. Likewise, for CPM No. 9, DPW's reports showed that it had repaired 100 percent of customer reported damaged stop and yield signs within 24 hours and 85 percent of reported street light bulb outages within 48 hours. The targets were 100 percent for both. Again, no information was available to support the monthly reports to OCA.

During our review, DPW advised that they were developing a system for tracking responses to requests for pothole repairs. Its system would measure the time between the receipt of a request and the repair of the pothole. DPW efforts may yield an acceptable system that may be exportable to other measures such as sign repair and street light outage repair.

### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

We recommend that the Director, DPW<sup>3</sup>, and the Acting Director, DDOT, establish management controls that would assure accurate and verifiable data in support of performance measures reported or to be reported.

### **DPW/DDOT RESPONSE**

The Director, DPW, deferred its response to the Acting Director, DDOT. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

The Acting Director, DDOT, responded that DDOT has established a management control system to appropriately verify data in support of performance measures reported or to be reported regarding the timely repair of potholes. The system is exportable for other measures such as sign repair and street light outage repair. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

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<sup>3</sup> At the time the OIG issued the related MAR, the Director, DPW, was the Interim Director.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **OIG COMMENTS**

The action taken by DDOT should ensure support for its performance measures. The recommendation is resolved and closed.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **FINDING 5: IMPLEMENTING CPMS NO. 2 - SENIOR MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS, NO. 3 - COMPETITIVE COSTING PILOTS, NO. 5 - RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN, AND NO. 6 - CLEAN CITY INITIATIVE PLAN**

DPW did not develop senior management agreements, proposed costing pilots, a risk management plan, and a Clean City Initiative operating plan although specifically included as performance requirements in the former Director's contract. The former Director departed in July 2000 without delegating or otherwise setting in place a means to implement the requirements. In addition, the then interim Director had not signed a contract with the Mayor for performance measures. Consequently, DPW did not meet or initiate these contract performance measures as intended by the performance contract between the Mayor and the prior DPW Director.

A representative of OCA informed us that the performance of the DPW Interim Director was acceptable for the Clean City Initiative operating plan because, although a plan had not been submitted as required, she kept the OCA fully aware of its plans through frequent briefings.

A representative of the OCA was considering making a recommendation to the new City Administrator that provisional performance agreements be established with interim and acting agency heads. We support that position.

### **RECOMMENDATION 5**

We recommend that the Deputy Mayor/City Administrator establish accountability for agency implementation of performance measures at all times, including those periods in which an acting or interim director is in charge of an agency.

### **OCA RESPONSE**

The Deputy Mayor/City Administrator agreed in principle with the recommendation. Incumbent permanent agency directors and incumbent interim Directors will execute a performance contract by mid-April. If a new director is appointed, the appointed director will execute strategic plans within 45 days of their appointment and will execute a performance contract based on that contract within 15 days. Future interim directors will be requested to develop a short-term action plan memo, within 30 days of their appointment, that commits the interim directors to address the performance requirements in their predecessor's performance contract or specify where their actions will differ. In addition, OCA plans to complete overall guidelines for the District's performance management system by the end of summer 2001 concurrent with draft performance contracts for agency directors. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **OIG COMMENTS**

OCA's planned action should establish accountability sooner and improve the performance management system. Its plans to provide District-wide guidelines for the performance management system by the end of summer 2001 should provide for more consistency and improved reporting. This recommendation is resolved.



## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### FINDING 6: MEASURING STREET RESURFACING — SCM NO. 2

The method used by DPW/DDOT to measure and report road resurfacing does not portray the actual area of surface covered, although the Mayor's SCM item No. 2 requires the resurfacing of 150 blocks and alleys. DPW/DDOT measures resurfaced areas linearly regardless of actual surface covered. For example, the agency would report curb-to-curb resurfacing of four lanes equally with spot resurfacing for one mile. Spot resurfacing, as its name implies, does not involve continuous resurfacing. Instead, spot resurfacing applies to portions of the road that were resurfaced although some lanes or interim distances were not affected. Consequently, the number of blocks reported as resurfaced was misleading. The total linear mileage resurfaced, both curb-to-curb and spot resurfaced, were converted into blocks (10 blocks to a mile). Four-lane curb-to-curb resurfacing had the same weight as spot resurfacing. We believe that spot resurfacing should not be included in this measure because it overstates what we believe are stakeholder expectations of resurfacing outputs/outcomes. Our physical observations showed that serious pavement problems existed in areas that were spot resurfaced. As of September 29, 2000, DPW/DDOT reported 36.304 miles resurfaced, i.e., about 363 blocks. However, 23.6 miles (236 blocks) were attributable to spot resurfacing. Nonetheless, DPW resurfaced 166 blocks, which exceeded its SCM goal of 150 resurfaced blocks of streets and alleys because it had resurfaced 124 blocks of streets and 42 blocks of alleys.

### RECOMMENDATION 6

We recommend that the Director, DPW, and the Acting Director, DDOT, disclose in future reporting of resurfaced areas the methodology employed in measuring, omit or reclassify spot resurfacing from its external performance reporting, and improve its controls by documenting and publishing definitions of the various resurfacing categories.

### DPW/DDOT RESPONSE

The Director, DPW, deferred to the Acting Director, DDOT.

DDOT largely agrees with the finding and supports the recommendation. DDOT will formalize reporting procedures to provide clear guidelines and establish them as Standard Operating Procedures by January 20, 2001. The finding does not apply to the measuring of blocks for the \$12 million Infrastructure Fund Emergency Resurfacing Program. These blocks were measured from "curb to curb" and "intersection to intersection" representing the complete block distance and width of the pavement. Spot resurfacing often includes full block milling and overlay, and DPW will continue to include spot resurfacing in such instances. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **OIG COMMENTS**

The proposed actions to formalize reporting procedures in DDOT Standard Operating Procedures should improve controls over performance measures. We also agree that DPW should include spot resurfacing in reporting performance only when it constitutes curb-to-curb resurfacing over an uninterrupted distance. The recommendation is resolved.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### **FINDING 7: CALCULATION OF SCORECARD MEASURE NO. 1 FOR WAIT TIME**

#### **SYNOPSIS**

DMV's reported results of reducing customer wait time for vehicle registration and driver's license services were incomplete and unintentionally overstated. These discrepancies resulted from excluding data from some locations from DMV's calculations and making mathematical errors in logic when combining data from different types of services that were being measured (for example: driver's license results and registration results). We attribute reporting discrepancies to management decisions that were intended to report consistently by omitting locations that started up during the year and that failed to fully recognize the effect of weighted data. As a result, the reported data was supported by incomplete information (38 percent of customers served were omitted from calculations) and overstated the percentage of customers who had waited less than 30 minutes to obtain services by as much as 19 percent.

#### **DISCUSSION**

The Director, DMV, and a representative of OCA agreed that DMV would have more consistent reporting for this measure by omitting performance data from new DMV locations that were not providing services at the beginning of the year. However, by including more locations, performance reporting would not have been more accurate and more comprehensive. The Director, DMV, and a representative of OCA were aware that including the data from the new locations would likely have shown better performance by DMV, but they wanted to report consistently for the year.

The longer such data is excluded, the less comparable the data will be from subsequent reporting years. One of the many benefits of performance reporting is comparing trends. However, in this instance, we believe management exercised its prerogative to exclude partial reporting for the year, especially since no guidelines existed to require including that data.

The Director, DMV, and a representative of OCA were also in agreement on the methodology used to calculate performance results by averaging the averages of different data categories. Averaging averages is not a mathematically correct method of making calculations but would have had no effect should each of the category averages have the same weight. An OCA representative recognized the potential for such error but advised that early tests showed that the categories had relatively equal weights. Apparently, the weighting changed during the year without detection resulting in unintentional reporting errors. These errors could have been avoided by using and combining raw data instead of averages.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### Scorecard Goal

DMV's SCM No. 1 was to reduce the wait time to 30 minutes, 80 percent of the time, for customers requesting driver's licenses and registration transactions. DMV reported that it met the SCM goal for the final month of FY 2000 by reducing the wait time for 80.4 percent of customers receiving licenses or registration services. Our calculations show that DMV attained a wait time of 30 minutes or less for only 68.8 percent of its customers for September 2000, that is, a 17 percent overstatement. Other months were calculated similarly.

DMV's data to support its results originated from an automated crowd-control ticket system that collects data by various categories. This system is referred to at DMV as the Q-Matic System. While the system automatically generates wait-time totals, DMV excluded some locations from its calculations, and incorrectly calculated overall results of the SCM when it combined data averages from different service categories, such as drivers license renewal, drivers license-first time, vehicles registration renewals, etc.

### Locations

DMV reported the results for only the main office location at 301 C Street but excluded results for customers waiting for service at the RFK Stadium trailer and at 616 H Street. Even at 301 C Street, customers served in room 1032 were excluded. For the last quarter of fiscal year 2000, as many as 5,359 customers had entered the crowd-control system at the main office but were not served according to the system. However, some of those customers may have been served in room 1032 as well as other customers who did not enter the crowd-control system. At the other locations (RFK Stadium trailer and 616 H Street) for the quarter, 37,981 customers served were excluded from SCM computations. Accordingly, about 38 percent of the 99,071 customers who were actually served were omitted from calculations.

**RFK Stadium Location.** Although the RFK Stadium location used the crowd-control system, DMV officials advised that results from this location were omitted. Officials omitted the data from this location from its performance reports because this location was not operating at the beginning of year. However, adding this or other locations would not have overstated reports except when the "averaging of averages" technique was used. Indicators are that this location easily exceeded the SCM goal for a relatively small number of customers (about 3.5 percent of those served at DMV for the quarter).

**H Street Location.** The H Street location was not included in the calculation because DMV did not track the wait time of customers serviced. DMV officials stated that the crowd-control system was not installed at the H Street location because it was to be closed and a new office opened. However, DMV had no immediate plans to close the location and had a crowd-control system available for installation at the H Street location. We were advised that a month-to-month lease exists for this location, and therefore, installation of the system would not be cost effective.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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### Calculations

DMV reported incorrect information to OCA regarding the SCM to reduce the wait time. DMV erred in its calculation when it used the crowd-control system generated percentages of the various categories (driver's license, first time registration, and renewal registration) and combined the averages of CPM results to obtain an overall average for the SCM. This averaging of averages is mathematically incorrect and resulted in overstated results. Using the method of averaging averages, DMV reported that the average wait times of customers requesting either license or registration services were 73.33, 79.56, and 80.40 percent for July, August, and September 2000, respectively. The correct calculation should have combined the total number of customers that had a wait time less than 30 minutes and divided it by all customers in the system who were served, i.e., the universe.

Our recalculation, using total customers served from monthly Qmatic System reports, showed that the correct percentages obtained for the respective periods were 66.9, 67.1, and 68.8 percent. A comparison of the difference in calculations indicated that DMV overstated the percentage of customers who had waited less than 30 minutes to obtain services by as much as 19 percent. We arrived at this percent of overstatement by subtracting from the reported figure for August 2000 (79.6 percent) our recalculation (67.1 percent). This difference (12.5 percent) divided by 67.1 percent equals 18.6, i.e., 19 percent.

### RECOMMENDATION 7

We recommend that the Director, DMV:

- a. Disclose in performance reports the extent to which the results capture or omit locations and customers;
- b. Include all locations when calculating contract performance measures and scorecard measures to the extent it is cost effective; and
- c. Develop written procedures and controls to describe proper methodology to measure, calculate, and report performance results.

### DMV RESPONSE

DMV plans to revise its scorecard goal prior to April 2001 to reflect recommendation 7.a. DMV also built a new spreadsheet to calculate performance that includes all locations where Q-Matic [the crowd-control system] is installed. The Director is reassessing DMV's current performance measurement procedures and controls, and expects to develop written guidelines by the end of April 2000. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **OIG COMMENT**

While DMV did not specifically address recommendation 7.b., its response to recommendation 7.c. to reassess current performance measurement procedures and controls should cover the intent of the recommendation. Also, DMV informed us, subsequent to the DMV response, that it was taking action to include the users of the H Street Station in the Q-Matic system. Accordingly, recommendations 7.a., 7.b., and 7.c. are resolved.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **FINDING 8: MEASURING INSPECTION SERVICE TIME, SCORECARD MEASURE NO. 3**

#### **SYNOPSIS**

DMV relied upon poorly controlled customer surveys and extensive clerical effort to measure and calculate actual inspection time because its managers were not aware that its Information Control Vehicle Inspection System automatically gathered the performance data. As a result, DMV has unnecessary labor costs associated with the clerical effort to calculate performance data, and its uncontrolled survey process is open to manipulation.

#### **DISCUSSION**

Notwithstanding the lack of controls over DMV surveys, our audit confirmed through independent means that its average inspection time was about 11 minutes per vehicle, well under the goal of 30 minutes service time per vehicle. However, while DMV reported that it exceeded its goal, the method used to capture and calculate the service time was unnecessary, time consuming to prepare, and relied on available survey forms submitted by the customer. In addition, the process lacked basic controls to ensure the integrity of the process. Among many deficiencies in controls, the primary deficiency was that the survey forms were available for manipulation by the station. Fortunately, an automated system was available to independently determine whether the survey results were reasonable. Our tests showed no indication that survey results were manipulated and that survey results and reported results were accurate.

DMV did not take advantage of its automated system, the Information Control Vehicle Inspection System (ICVIS), which captures vehicle and test information during the inspection process. DMV managers were not aware that ICVIS recorded and measured service inspection time from the start of the inspection to the end of the inspection and was capable of providing various reports including daily and monthly average vehicle inspection time. As a result, extensive clerical personnel time was expended to calculate vehicle inspection time from customer survey forms when information more accurate than survey gathering was available through ICVIS. To obtain the information, ICVIS queries needed to be written. We do not believe that the costs associated with obtaining these reports from the ICVIS system will be significant.

#### **RECOMMENDATION 8**

We recommend that the Director, DMV, discontinue computing average service time using customer surveys and determine the average inspection service time of a vehicle by obtaining the data from ICVIS.

## **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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### **DMV RESPONSE**

DMV will discontinue computing average service time using customer service surveys at the end of February, and begin to determine the inspection service time through data derived from a more appropriate method by the end of March 2001. See Exhibit 2 for the full text of the response.

### **OIG COMMENTS**

DMV's planned actions should improve the reliability of performance data. The recommendation is resolved.